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ABSTRACT 
Botnets are considered one of the most dangerous and serious 
security threats facing the networks and the Internet. 
Comparing with the other security threats, botnet members 
have the ability to be directed and controlled via C&C 
messages from the botmaster over common protocols such as 
IRC and HTTP, or even over covert and unknown 
applications. As for IRC botnets, general security instances 
like firewalls and IDSes do not provide by themselves a viable 
solution to prevent them completely. These devices could not 
differentiate well between the legitimate and malicious traffic 
of the IRC protocol. So, this paper is proposing an IDS-based 
and multi-phase IRC botnet and botnet behavior detection 
model based on C&C responses messages and malicious 
behaviors of the IRC bots inside the network environment.  
The proposed model has been evaluated on five network 
traffic traces from two different network environments 
(Virtual network and DARPA 2000 Windows NT Attack Data 
Set). The results show that the proposed model could detect 
all the infected IRC botnet member(s), state their current 
status of attack, filter their malicious IRC messages, pass the 
other normal IRC messages and detect the botnet behavior 
regardless of the botnet communication protocol with very 
low false positive rate. The proposed model has been 
compared with some of the existing and well-known 
approaches, including BotHunter, BotSniffer and Rishi 
regarding botnet characteristics taken in each approach. The 
comparison showed that the proposed model has made a 
progress on the comparative models by not to rely on a certain 
time window or specific bot signatures.  
General Terms 
Network Security, Botnet, Malicious activity. 
Keywords 
IRC Botnet, IRC Botnet detection, Monitoring of Network 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the botnets become the most dangerous 
threats that can threaten the existing services and resources 
over the Internet. Many malicious activities could be 
performed for exploiting the victims (bots) to attack another 
victim. The bot itself is malicious software like the common 
computer viruses and worms. The bots could be distinguished 
from the other malicious software by implementing Command 
and Control (C&C) directions, which are  set of messages that 
can be used by the botmaster to direct and control the 
connected bots through certain connection channel (IRC or 
HTTP). In this way, the attacker will be able to evade himself 
by exploiting the bots to attack another victim. However, the 
bots could be found in any  environment like in home, 
schools, banks and any of governmental institutes making use 
of system vulnerabilities and software bugs to separate and 
execute a lot of malicious activities. Recently, bots can be the 
major one of the major sources for distributing or performing 
many kinds of scanning related attacks (Distributed Denial-of-
Service DoS) [1], spamming [2], click fraud [3], identity 
fraud, sniffing traffic and key logging [4] etc. The nature of 
the bots activities is to respond to the botmaster's control 
command simultaneously. This responding will enable the 
botmaster to get the full benefit from the infected hosts to 
attack another target like in DDoS [5].  From what stated 
earlier, the botnet can be defined as a group of connected 
agents (bots) controlled by certain botmaster and can perform 
similar communication pattern and malicious attacks toward 
certain victim(s) [6]. Mainly, botnets could be characterized 
into two types; the first one is the centralized  architecture 
whereby all  the bots will connect and controlled by certain 
botmaster using IRC (Internet Relay Chat) [7] and HTTP. In 
IRC-based architecture, the botmaster will interact with the 
bots directly and in real time manner using (IRC PRIVMSG), 
while in HTTP-based the bot will periodically connect to the 
C&C server to obtain the command in a centralized way [7]. 
The second architecture of botnet architecture is P2P (Point to 
Point) architecture. This architecture does not have a central 
C&C server, and all the bots will be connected to each other 
to get controlled. Because of the property of not having any 
centralized C&C server, P2P botnet does not suffer from a 
single point of failure [8]. However, the central architecture is 
proven more flexible to the attackers. Since it provides instant 
interaction with dozens of zombies (bots) efficiently, therefore 
the advantage of the botmaster will be maximized by 
exploiting all of those bots [7,9]. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
Defending against botnet activities is focusing on detection 
and monitoring, prevention and mitigation botnet activities 
that outgoing from the internal environment network. 
According toZeidanloo and Manaf in [10], botnet detection 
and monitoring can be classified into two main categories, 
which are honeynet analysis based and IDS-based. In IDS-
based, the detection could be classified into anomaly and 
signature based. The anomaly-based botnet detection can also 
subdivided into anomaly host-based and anomaly network-
based.   
Honeynet is a group of instances that have real systems, 
applications and services with no production and 
authorization activities [11]. So, any outgoing or incoming 
connection (C&C of IRC or HTTP) to these systems will be 
captured and analyzed as a suspicious activity. Many research 
papers have addressed botnet detection depending on 
honeynet. Nepenthes, which is a honeypot-based framework 
has been proposed by Baecher et al. in [12] for collecting self-
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replication malware that use a variety of protocols including; 
TFTP, FTP, IRC, HTTP and custom protocols, all in wide-
scale environment. The framework virtualized only the 
vulnerable services in the honeypot for more efficiency. Good 
deployment strategy has been proposed in the framework, as a 
precautionary measure to prevent the framework from getting 
exploited. Botnet behavior study  is one of the most important 
methodologies to understand botnet phenomenon.Zhichun et 
al.have proposed a honeynet-based framework for botnet 
detection depending on botnet scanning behavior [13]. 
Honeynet has been used to detect the scanning activities of the 
bots. The authors decided to depend on such activity  since the 
scanning process can be considered the initial  step to 
maintain the availability of the bot.  
IDS has been employed to detect bots and their activities since 
it is considered one of the devices that used to accomplish 
defense in depth strategy along with IPS (Intrusion Prevention 
System) and firewall. The main purpose of the IDS is to raise 
an alarm on detecting malicious or anomalous activity within 
network traffic. Mainly, IDS could be classified according to 
the method that been used to detect the malicious activity to: 
signature-based and anomaly-based IDS. Signature-based 
method can only detect the verified and known signatures, 
meaning to say that zero-day botnet activity will not be 
detected. Goebel and Holzhave proposed Rishiin [14], which 
is a passive monitoring botnet detection approach based on 
IRC signatures. This approach exploits n-gram analysis and 
scoring system to detect the suspicious IRC nickname's 
patterns, IRC server and uncommon server ports in the 
monitored network, for giving an evidence for botnet 
existence. In the large-scale network, identifying application 
communications could be a good way to identify normal 
behavior (made by human) from the anomalous behavior of 
bots [15]. This approach has been exploited byLiuet al. in[15], 
where the network traffic of known applications will be 
identified depending on signature-based approach of each 
application. N-gram features also extracted and clustered to 
verify the anomalous behavior of the identified application. 
Anomaly-based approach depends on monitoring certain 
behaviors to detect the anomalous activities. Many properties 
can be monitored to give an evidence of botnet existing like 
high traffic on unusual ports, unusual high traffic, high 
consuming bandwidth and high latency in the network [6]. 
Binkley and Singh proposed an algorithm based on anomaly 
strategy to detect IRC botnet clients and server inside the 
monitored network [16]. The proposed algorithm combines 
two tuples, IRC botnet detection along with TCP SYN 
scanning detection heuristic. IRC tuple produced two tuples, 
one for distinguishing IRC based on the IP channel name,  and 
the other sub-tuple is responsible for providing TCP work 
weight on individual IRC channels. 
Host-based is kind of anomaly strategy that is depending on 
monitoring botnet behaviors via the host. Stinson and Mitchell  
have proposed host-based analysis approach to detect the 
botnets command behaviors called BotSwat [17]. Mainly, this 
approach depends on distinguishing the remote invocations 
calls that issued by the botmaster to the bots from the local 
invocations calls that could be issued legitimately. In 
network-based strategy, the network flow will be considered 
in the process of botnet and botnet behavior detection. In this 
strategy, there are two ways which are network-based active 
monitoring and network-based passive monitoring. Gu et al. 
proposed BotProbe[18], which is an efficient approach based 
on active monitoring, where the IRC C&C interactions of bots 
distinguished from common IRC messages issued by human 
based on C&C signatures. The authors proposed a hypothesis 
testing framework based on cause and effect approach for 
probing behaviors that can happen when sending additional 
packets to the suspicious hosts and observing its response for 
several times. BotSniffer byGu et al. depended on the network 
passive monitoring approach [7].  This method is an anomaly-
based  approach focusing on the Spatial-temporal and 
similarity correlation mechanism for the C&C messages  
(IRC-based and HTTP-based) botnets and other botnet 
activities within a certain time window. 
In this paper, the proposed work touches certain research 
areas related to botnet detection techniques and  network 
monitoring approaches to obtain the required features for IRC 
botnet and botnet behavior detection. So, itcould be classified 
as an IDS-based botnet detection model that is depending on 
anomaly passive network monitoring and IRC responses 
messages behavior for detecting IRC bot(s). As for botnet 
behavior, the proposed model is also IDS-based approach but 
with network active monitoring and botnet behavioral based 
for the detected attacks that achieve the definition of botnet 
attacks.  
3. The Proposed Approach 
IDS is a powerful tool that can be used to monitor botnet 
member's activities by detecting IRC responses messages of 
the bots through IRC channel and their outgoing attacks. 
However, the problem with IDS alerts is the poor quality. The 
non-well optimized sensor could produce a lot of false alerts, 
especially for the botnet attacks that could make the alert's 
analysis process inefficient. The input lines of the proposed 
model will be from the raw events of the IDS alerts. So, a way 
to filter out and cluster the alerts has been proposed whereby 
the false alerts could be reduced as possible. In the upcoming 
sections, the main used methods beside the phases of botnet 
detection will be addressed. 
3.1 Alerts Correlation 
IDS alerts raised for wide ranges of network malicious 
activities. There are several alerts' attributes of those 
activities, including (source IP, destination IP, timestamp, 
signature name, etc.). These attributes could be similar or 
different regarding to the situation of the attack. So, studying 
and analyzing the relationships (correlations) and similarities 
between these attributes as a group could provide efficient 
information about certain activity without examining the 
alerts individually. Dingbang and Peng in [19] classified alerts 
correlation methods into four methods:  
1-  Finding the similarities between the alerts' attributes.  
2- Matching the alerts according to a predefined attack 
scenario.  
3- Matching alerts' attributes depending on causes and effects 
(preconditions and consequences)  of certain attack's 
scenarios, where the effects of those attacks will be matched 
with the causes that could produce such effects.  
4-  The last method will depend on retrieving information 
from multiple sources and integrating them together with IDS 
alerts.  
In the proposed model,the used correlation method is spatial-
temporal correlation method [7], which is a special case of the 
first method of correlation methods (alerts similarities). 
3.2 Spatial-Temporal Correlation and 
Similarities Method 
Since the observed behaviors could be represented through 
IDS alerts, so an efficient method should be used for 
analyzing these alerts lead to infer on the existence of botnet. 
The spatial-temporal correlation method is trying to find the 
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relationship between the spatial alerts' attributes which are 
(signature name, source IP, source port, destination IP and 
destination port) and the temporal attribute which is the 
timestamp value. This method will be exploited to analyze all 
alerts related to IRC protocol that having similar attributes. 
Then the alerts will be clustered based the similarity method. 
The type of that clustering will be used over all the phases of 
the proposed model, as will be clarified in the upcoming 
sections. 
3.3 The Multi-phase IRC Botnet and 
Botnet Behavior Detection Model 
Algorithm 
In this paper, the botnet behaviors  will be modeled based on 
its phases in the life-cycle. So, the proposed model will 
consist of two phases for IRC botnet and botnet behavior 
detection (Phase 1 and Phase 2). Where Phase 1 is 
representing Phase 2 of botnet life-cycle (communication 
phase), while Phase 2 is representing phase 3 of botnet life-
cycle (attacking phase). Figure 1 is depicted the proposed 
model's components and its stages. 
 
Fig 1: The proposed model for IRC botnet and botnet behavior detection
 
4. The Proposed phases and the Process 
Flows Modes of the Model 
There are two phases in the proposed model, the first phase of 
the model will not represent the first phase of the botnet life-
cycle since the used methods in this phase are varying 
between exploiting the operating systems and services' 
vulnerabilities to the exploitation of social engineering tactics 
[20]. However, the first phase will be responsible for 
collecting all initial outgoing IRC C&C responses messages 
of the bot in case of standard or non-standard IRC ports. The 
second phase will deal with the botnet behaviors, where these 
behaviors will be divided into IRC replies and other detected 
botnet attacks like DDoS. The proposed phases also will be 
divided into parts, where every part will represent certain 
activity in the proposed process flows (coherent or non-
coherent). As for the process flow of the model, there are two 
process flows in the proposed model. The first one is the 
coherent mode. In this phase the focusing will be on the IRC 
responses messages which are related to the verified initial 
IRC bot activities on any port. The implementation of this  
 
flow will show that the detected bot was monitored from its 
initial activity. Non-coherent mode is the second flow, where 
the IRC responses messages which are not related to the initial 
IRC activity will be treated. The upcoming subsections will 
address in details the implementation of the proposed phases 
and the implicit stages of filtering, clustering and correlation 
beside the expected results within each one. 
4.1 Phase 1 
The first phase of the model is responsible for collecting the 
initial and suspicious IRC C&C bot connections in coherent 
mode process flow.  The suspicious IRC bot connections on 
the non-standard IRC ports will be in Part A and the IRC bot 
connections on the standard defined IRC ports (6661-6668) 
will be in Part B.  In the other side, the IRC bot responses to 
the botmaster on any IRC ports will be in Part 2 of this phase. 
To achieve this phase and all of its parts, three IRC signature 
rules have been exploited from default Snort signature rules in 
Snort version (2.8.5.2). In Part 1 (both Part A and B), two 
rules have been used, one from [21] for monitoring IRC 
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NICK changes at the initial IRC bot connectivity and for 
tracking the destination port of the  botmaster IRC C&C 
server. The second one is for detecting the IRC responses 
messages (PRIVMSG) on the tracked IRC port. The Part 2 of 
this phase is achieved by implementing a simple rule to detect 
the ordinary IRC PRIVMSG on any port. The standard range 
of IRC ports has been assumed based on Bleeding Snort rule 
(bleeding-attack_response.rules), which is assuming that 
every IRC PRIVMSG coming from every port except the 
range (6661-6668) is an IRC attack response on non-
standardIRC port [22]. The defined range of standard IRC 
ports is flexible  and can be changed to accommodate the 
desired network policy rules regarding to the IRC service 
policy. Both of the standard and non-standard IRC ports will 
be treated in the proposed model, but in a different way. 
However, every part of this phase will be implemented 
concurrently with the three stages (filtering, similarity and 
clustering) as follows: 
4.1.1 Phase 1 - Part 1 
This part is achieving by employing a set of Snort signature 
rules proposed by Bianco[21]. However, these rules are 
suffering from false positive results on IRC botnet detection. 
Since they cannot distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate IRC connections. The problem of false positive 
IRC botnet will be handled on the filtering stage of this part. 
Bianco has proposed 3 rules to detect the initial IRC behavior 
for the bots. The first rule (rule 1) is responsible for 
monitoring and tagging the IRC bot connection request and 
then preserves the destination port of the IRC C&C server for 
connection monitoring purpose. Rule 2 is responsible for 
monitoring any response that comes from the monitored IRC 
C&C server on the monitored IRC destination port. Rule 3 
(the added rule) is responsible for detecting the outgoing IRC 
PRIVMSG in any port number, and this response will be on 
the same IRC destination port that has been tagged already by 
rule 1. In the proposed model, only rule 1 and rule 3 will be 
used to track the initial IRC bot behaviors stated above. The 
implementation of the first part of Phase 1 will be divided into 
two parts. Both of them will be implemented by implementing 
the three stages respectively (filtering, similarity and 
clustering). Firstly, Part A will be implemented by filtering 
the raw alerts and takes only the alerts that related to the 
initial IRC responses messages that can be represented by the 
rule 3 on the non-standard IRC ports. As for Part B, only 
alerts that belong to rule 3 on the standard IRC port (6661-
6668) will be collected. In the second stage, similarity stage, 
where similar alerts that belong to rule 3 and having similar 
alerts attributes like (timestamp and source port) that appear 
in both Part 1 (Part A and Part B), and Part 2 will be kept in 
Part 1(Part A or Part B) and omitted from Part 2. Since rule 3 
has been added to track IRC message responses in coherent 
mode and the other rule in Part 2 also represent the IRC 
message responses (PRIVMSG) but for the non-coherent 
mode. The clustering stage is different in each part, where in 
Part A alerts' attributes like (timestamp, source IP, source 
port, destination IP and destination port) will be clustered for 
every alert on the non-standard IRC port. On the other hand, 
for Part B, the same attributes will be taken but for more than 
one IRC bot acting at the same timestamp on the standard IRC 
port. The clustered alerts in Part A and Part B will extract the 
bots that are responsible for the initial IRC behaviors. These 
bots will be saved in Report 1.1 and get status message 1 
"Coherent mode: IRC bot has illegitimate IRC connection on 
non-standard IRC port". As for Part B, its results will be saved 
in Report 1.2 and get status message 2 "Coherent mode: IRC 
bot has illegitimate IRC connection on  standard IRC port". 
4.1.2 Phase 1 - Part 2 
The second part of Phase 1 will be responsible for detecting 
the outgoing C&C responses of the bots to the botmaster on 
any range of IRC ports (non-coherent mode). Again in this 
part, the main stages (filtering, similarity and clustering) will 
be performed to get the bots that have similar IRC response 
messages to a certain IRC C&C server  (botmaster) at the 
same timestamp. In the filtering stage, all alerts which are 
representing outgoing IRC responses (PRIVMSG) will be 
collected. The collected alerts will be filtered in a way to 
ensure that the responses are happening as  C&C responses 
messages to a botmaster C&C. This kind of filtering will 
lookfor similar alerts having similar alerts attributes like 
(timestamp, destination IP, destination port) for more than one 
IRC bot working together at the same timestamp.  At this 
stage, the  timestamp value of first outgoing IRC PRIVMSG 
that appears in the tested network traffic will be preserved as 
(time_log) for filtering purpose in Phase 2. Similarity stage 
between Part 1 (Part A and Part B) and Part 2 will be 
implemented to ensure that Part 2 will take only the alerts that 
belong to the non-coherent mode. The similarity stage will be 
achieved by matching alerts' attributes such as (timestamp, 
source port) that appears on both filtering alerts of Part 1(Part 
A and Part B) and Part 2. Finally, the clustering stage will be 
performed to extract the IRC bots that are performing IRC 
responding activities, by clustering (source IP, source port, 
destination IP and destination Port) for more than one IRC 
bot.  These bots will be saved in Report 2 and get status 
message 9 "Non-coherent mode: IRC bot has illegitimate IRC 
connection".  In coherent mode, Report 1.1 and Report 1.2 are 
ready now to be correlated with the second phase of the 
proposed model. Report 1.1 also could be completely empty, 
if the Snort signature rules failed for any reason to detect the 
IRC connection request and responses. In such a case, the 
proposed model will not consider Part 1 at all and skip it to 
Part 2. As for the result of IRC botnet detection, it  will be in 
non-coherent mode. 
4.2 Phase 2 
This phase is representing the attacking phase of the botnet's 
life-cycle, so it will deal with the alerts of the outbound 
attacking traffic. This part will be divided into two parts (Part 
1 and Part 2). Each part will be responsible for a kind of 
botnet attack. The first part is responsible for IRC attacks 
(information stealing through the IRC channel of the bot). The 
second part will be designated for the detected botnet attacks 
like DDoS attacks. The first part of this phase will be divided 
into two parts (Part C and Part D), where Part C will be for 
IRC replies on non-standard range of IRC ports, and Part D 
will be for IRC replies on the standard range of IRC ports. 
4.2.1 Phase 2 - Part 1 
As stated earlier, the Part 1 will be divided into two parts (Part 
C and Part D).  Part C will collect all outgoing alerts that 
represent IRC responses messages  (C&C responses) on the 
non-standard IRC ports to the IRC C&C server. In the process 
of filtering, these alerts will be collected with timestamp 
longer than the preserved (time_log) to ensure that there are 
continuous C&C responses between the detected IRC bot  and 
its botmaster at the same IRC channel. The filtered alerts will 
be clustered according to alerts' attributes like (source IP, 
source port, destination IP and destination port). This part will 
be used also to detect the activity of the one IRC bot that 
works on the non-standard IRC port. So, the clustered IRC bot 
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will get status message 7 "IRC bot has illegitimate IRC 
connection on non-standard IRC port".  As for Part D, the 
filtering procedure will be the same as in Part C, but for the 
C&C responses on the standard range of IRC ports (6661-
6668).  This part will not be clustered, since the alerts of this 
part will be used for correlation with other parts for purpose 
of IRC botnet member(s) detection. 
4.2.2 Phase 2 - Part 2 
As stated earlier, Part 2 of Phase 2 will be responsible for 
detecting the botnet attacks. So, all the outgoing alerts from 
the internal host(s) with signature names that not included the 
filtering list and with timestamp longer than or equal 
(time_log) will be collected. These alerts will be filtered in a 
way to ensure that the collected alerts are  achieving the 
botnet attacking definition. The alerts' attributes in the botnet 
attack should achieve similar alerts attributes like (timestamp, 
destination IP, destination port and signature name). That is 
meaning that the produced alerts are representing attacks from 
the internal host(s)  toward a certain destination (IP and port) 
that repeated concurrently more than once. In the clustering 
stage, all the filtered alerts will be clustered according to 
(source IP and signature name) to extract the hosts and the 
names of the detected attacks. These hosts will be stored in 
Report 4 to be correlated with the results of Phase 1 and Phase 
2 (Report 1.1, Report 1.2, Report 2, Report 3.1 and Report 
3.2). 
4.3 Spatial-Temporal Correlation and 
Similarity Engine 
The final stage for botnet detection is the spatial-temporal 
correlation and similarity engine. The stage will deal with six 
input lines. These lines  will be pointed by their reports' 
numbers (Report 1.1, Report 1.2, Report 2, Report 3.1, Report 
3.2 and Report 4). All the reports will be correlated together 
in a certain way to come up with the final result of botnet 
detection. The detection results will be divided into three parts 
based on the obtained information from Phase 1 and number 
of the bot inside the network, to coherent mode results, non-
coherent mode results and one IRC bot results  on the 
standard and non-standard IRC ports. 
4.3.1  Coherent Mode Correlation Results 
The results of coherent mode process flow will be divided to 
coherent mode on the non-standard IRC ports, coherent mode 
on the standard IRC ports and the one IRC bot on the non-
standard IRC port's results. Figure 2 is showing the correlation 
process steps for coherent mode and the one IRC bot on the 
non-standard IRC ports.The whole process of coherent mode 
correlation results will be clarified as follows: 
1. Correlation of non-standard IRC results 
The results of Report 1.1 that has the initial detected IRC 
bot(s) of non-standard IRC ports will be correlated with the 
raw alerts' results of Report 3.1 that has the suspicious IRC 
responses message on the non-standard IRC ports also. This 
correlation process will look for similar and continuous C&C 
responses messages for the initially detected bots in Report 
1.1. This objective will be achieved by correlating similar 
alerts' attributes (source IP, source port, destination IP and 
destination port) where Report 3.1 has timestamp longer than 
timestamp on Report1.1. The taken attributes, except 
timestamp, are representing the bot patterns that can appear 
for the same IRC bot behavior at different intervals 
(timestamps). Since every IRC bot will take certain and 
unique source port on a specific host (source IP) to respond to 
certain IRC C&C server (destination IP and destination port). 
The result of this part will produce the detected IRC bot(s) 
that have connected to a malicious IRC C&C server and still 
have continued and malicious C&C responses to that server at 
different time intervals. So, the status field of that bot(s) will 
be "Coherent mode: IRC bot has illegitimate IRC connection 
on non-standard IRC port and C&C response(s)". The process 
of correlation will not stop here, where the produced results 
from the previous correlation will be further correlated with 
the results of Report 4. This correlation will look for botnet 
attacks that could be happened when the bot received a 
command from the botmaster. So, alerts attribute like (source 
IP and timestamp) will be considered. This correlation means, 
if one of the internal hosts (source IP) has been detected 
performing botnet attack in Report 4, and has an outgoing 
IRC response message from Report 3.1 at same timestamp; 
this host will be indexed to be correlated with the results of 
the previous correlation results. So, if this pattern appeared on 
the indexed host(s) of the second correlation part; this bot(s) 
will get status "Coherent mode: IRC bot has illegitimate IRC 
connection on non-standard IRC port, C&C response(s) and 
botnet attack". The detected bot(s) in this part will be 
considered fully utilized IRC bots by the botmaster. Report 
1.1 had initial IRC bots and C&C responses. So, the results of 
Report 1.1 will be compared with the final coherent 
correlation of non-standard IRC port results; to make sure that 
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Fig 2: The coherent mode correlation steps and the one IRC bot on the non-standard IRC ports correlation 
 
all the detected IRC bots in Report 1.1 are not repeated in the 
last correlation result of non-standard IRC ports. Finally, both 
of non-standard IRC results and standard IRC results will be 
grouped as final coherent results before being saved in  Report 
5, which is representing the final report of IRC botnet 
detection. 
2. Correlation of standard IRC results 
This kind of correlation will be quite the same as the previous 
part of correlation but with different reports, where Report 1.2 
will be correlated first with Report 3.2, and the result of 
correlation will be correlated with Report 4. Firstly, The result 
of Report 1.2 which is representing the initial detected IRC 
bot  on the standard IRC ports will be correlated with the 
result of Report 3.2, which has the alerts of the IRC responses 
messages on the same IRC ports.  The results of this 
correlation process will get status message stated that the 
detected bot(s) in "Coherent mode: IRC bot has illegitimate 
IRC connection on standard IRC port and C&C response(s)". 
Secondly, the previous result will be correlated with Report 4 
looking for any botnet behavior (botnet attack) for the 
detected bots. This correlation process is including indexing 
the host(s) that are performing the botnet attack in Report 4 
atthe same timestamp with an IRC response message from 
Report 3.2. After that, the results of the first correlation will 
be correlated with the  indexed host(s) of each result.  The 
purpose of this correlation is to look for the host of the 
detected IRC bot. Finally, the detected bot  will get this status 
message "Coherent mode: IRC bot has illegitimate IRC 
connection on standard IRC port, C&C response(s) and botnet 
attack". 
3. One bot on non-standard IRC results 
The single botnet member in the monitored network which 
works on the non-standard IRC port will be detected also. 
Generally, all IRC bots and even the single bot that have 
initial IRC activity (NICK) and work on non-standard IRC 
port should be detected in the coherent mode. However, in the 
event when the initial activity of the bot is missing, the single 
bot will have only ordinary C&C responses. The clustering of 
Report 3.1 which contains all suspicious C&C responses on 
non-standard IRC port will detect that bot with the status 
message "IRC bot has illegitimate IRC connection on non-
standard IRC port". After that, the correlation of botnet 
member(s) in Report 3.1 and Report 4 will be achieved by 
looking for any botnet attack from that bot(s). The detected 
bots will get the status message "IRC bot has illegitimate IRC 
connection on non-standard IRC port and botnet attack". The 
result of this correlation will be compared with the results of 
the final correlation of coherent mode on non-standard IRC 
ports, and also with the final results of the non-coherent mode 
correlation; to make sure that the detected bot has not been 
detected earlier.  
4.3.2 Non-coherent Mode Correlation 
The results of non-coherent mode process flow will be 
divided into non-coherent mode on all ports and  one bot on 
the standard IRC ports. 
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1. Non-coherent mode on all portsresults 
This part of correlation is quite similar to the previous part 
(coherent mode); the difference will be on the chosen part 
from Phase 1. The results of Report 2 will be correlated with 
its raw alerts to look for similar and continuous C&C 
responses messages issued from its detected bots. The 
timestamp value in the raw alerts' report  should be longer 
than timestamp value in Report 2 for the same pattern. So, any 
duplicated pattern with longer timestamp in the raw alerts' 
report will state that the detected bot in Report 2 has a 
continuous C&C responses on the same IRC C&C server. The 
detected bots will get the status message  "Non-coherent 
mode: IRC bot has illegitimate connection and continues 
C&C response(s)". The next part of correlation will take the 
results of the first correlation of non-coherent mode and 
correlate them with Report 4. Firstly, the raw alerts of Report 
2 will be correlated with Report 4 looking for any C&C 
response in the raw alerts that responsible for any botnet 
attack in Report 4. The host (source IP) that has the attack at 
the same timestamp of C&C response will be indexed for the 
final stage of correlation. The final correlation will be 
achieved  by correlating the first correlation results with the 
result of the indexed host(s). The bots that are achieving this 
correlation will get status "Non-coherent mode: IRC bot has 
illegitimate connection, continues C&C response(s) and 
botnet attack". The final result of non-coherent correlation 
will be saved in Report 5. As stated earlier, Report 2 is having 
a part of IRC botnet detection results of non-coherent mode. 
So, the results in Report 2 will be compared with the final 
non-coherent correlation results obtained from the final 
correlation stage. Finally, the detected IRC bots will be added 
to  Report 5. 
2. One bot on standard IRC results 
Single IRC bot can be detected by correlating results of 
Report 3.2, which has the alerts of IRC responses messages on 
the standard IRC ports, along with the results of Report 4 
looking for similar alerts' attributes (source IP and 
timestamp). The chosen attributes will detect all the internal 
host(s) that has been found having a C&C response at the 
same timestamp with an outgoing botnet attack. Finally, the 
results of this correlation will be compared with the results of 
both non-coherent and coherent mode on the standard IRC 
results, which stated earlier by checking the similar (source 
port and timestamp), to ensure that the detected bot had not 
been detected earlier. As for the status message for detected 
bots, it will be "IRC bot has illegitimate IRC connection on 
standard IRC port and botnet attack". As stated earlier, the 
results of Report 4 in Part 2 of Phase 2 can help a lot in the 
process of botnet detection regardless of the used botnet 
communication protocol. So, Report 4 will be included 
individually in the final results of botnet detection. All the 
results of Non-coherent mode correlation will be saved in the 
final detection report (Report 5). Finally, the malicious IRC 
C&C responses messages would be filtered from the total IRC 
messages after getting the final results from Report 5. The 
malicious IRC messages will be filtered by correlating (source 
IP, source port, destination IP and destination port) between 
Report 5 and the raw alerts of Report 2 to get only the 
malicious IRC messages alerts. 
5. Evaluation 
This section will  prove the efficiency and the accuracy of the 
proposed model to detect the IRC botnet member(s) and their 
behaviors. In fact, there will be two conducted case studies; 
first one is on Virtual network with multiple botnet infection 
scenarios. The second one will be on DARPA 2000 - 
Windows NT Attack Data Set that contains normal IRC along 
with Windows NT attack. Based on the obtained results, the 
comparison will be between the proposed model and some of 
the well-known approaches in the field of IRC botnet 
detection, including BotHunter[23], BotSniffer[7] and Rishi 
[14]. The benchmark of the comparison will be in terms of the 
botnet characteristics for the chosen approaches. 
5.1 Building Experiment  
As stated earlier, the proposedmodel depends on Snort sensor 
to generate alerts on the suspicious activities. So, Snort IDS 
should be installed on the system that is scheduled to be the 
network monitoring system. The proposed model will take the 
raw alerts and analyze them to produce the detected botnet 
member(s). Nmap, the network scanning tool, also will be 
used to collect all  the hosts inside the monitoring network. 
The chosen system to achieve the experiment is Unix-based 
system (Ubuntu Linux) installed with all needed tools for the 
experiment. These tools will include Apache as a web server, 
PHP and MySQL for implementing the proposed model. In 
the experiment, the monitored network will be on a virtual 
network which is constructed inside VMware Workstation, 
and the Snort machine will be one of them. Figure 3 is 
depicting clearly the design of the testing environment. 
 
Fig3: VMware testing environment 
5.1.1 IRC Bots 
There are two different types of IRC bots will be exploited in 
the experiment.One of them is considered  common and well-
known type of IRC bot which is Rxbot and the other one is a 
new one, which is CRIME SCENCE bot. CRIME SCENE Bot 
has been developed recently byJarad G.[24]. Of the most 
important features of this bot is that it has been written in 
three different types of programming languages like (C++, C# 
and Python). CRIME SCENE Bot has a lot of other useful 
features to the botmaster like Email notification and FTP 
connectivity to upload the leaked information. 
5.2 Evaluation Case Studies 
There will be two case studies to be conducted to evaluate the 
efficiency and the accuracy of the proposed model. These case 
studies will represent multiple botnet scenarios for the IRC 
bots in different situations and behaviors.  
5.2.1 Case Study 1: Virtual Network 
Experiment 
This case study will be divided into multiple scenarios to 
represent different situations of existing botnet inside the 
monitored network with different intervals of monitoring 
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time.  The taken procedures of these scenarios will be 
clarified as follows: 
1. Botnet Scenario 1: Detecting Multiple Kinds of Bots in 
Initial IRC Activity 
The first objective of this scenario is to show the efficiency of 
the proposed model to detect IRC bots that have initial 
activity (NICK messages).The second objective of this 
scenario is to prove that the proposed model can detect IRC 
botnet member(s) that working on different IRC destination 
ports and IPs. The internal hosts of the network have been 
infected manually with five bots (two CRIME SCENE bots in 
PC2 and PC3 and three RxBot bots in PC1, PC2 and PC3). 
RxBot type will connect to local C&C server on  standard 
IRC port 6667 and CRIME SCENE bots will connect to 
remote C&C server on non-standard IRC port 7000. 
2. Botnet Scenario 2: Detecting Multiple Kinds of Bots in 
Middle of IRC Activity 
 
The first objective of this scenario is to show the efficiency of 
the proposed method to detect botnet members that do not 
have any initial activity (NICK) and do not have any kind of 
detectable network attacks like DDoS attack. The second 
objective is to evaluate the detection efficiency after updating 
the Snort signature rules with rules from Bleeding Snort web 
site [22]. The third objective is to evaluate the efficiency of 
the proposed model to filter out the normal IRC messages 
toward single IRC  server (same destination IP and destination 
port) without any false positive results for botnet detection. To 
achieve this situation in the experiment, four bots in different 
situations will be used (two CRIME SCENE bots with initial 
activities and two RxBot bots without initial activities).  
3. Botnet Scenario 3: Detecting Single Bot Members at 
Different Situations 
 
The objective of this IRC botnet scenario is to show the 
efficiency of the proposed model to detect single botnet 
members from different botnets at different situations and 
behaviors inside the monitoring network. To achieve this 
situation in the experiment, three bots have been used, two 
bots from CRIME SCENE (one of them has the initial IRC 
bot activity and other has not) with one RxBot bot without 
initial IRC activity.  
5.2.2 Case Study 2: Windows NT Attack 
DARPA 2000 Network Traffic Data Set 
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) 2000 
is an intrusion-detection evaluation data set contains multiple 
network attacking scenarios. This data set is mainly designed 
to evaluate the detection probability and false detection 
probability for the network security system under test, 
especially in the intrusion-detection research field [25].  In 
this paper, Windows NT Attack Data Set from DARPA 2000 
will be used  to evaluate the proposed model. The main 
objective will be to show that the proposed model can pass 
through the normal IRC chatting, which is happening on 
standard IRC port 6667 without  any false positive result of 
IRC botnet inside the network.  This data set contains two 
flows from two networks; one for the Inside and one for 
Outside network. 
5.3 Results and Discussion 
The obtained results will be discussed by reviewing the total 
number of alerts that obtained from each experiment with the 
percentages of the IRC messages alerts (normal and 
malicious). The proposed model will be evaluated also 
regarding to how the proposed model could achieve the 
proposed objectives and state the current status of the detected 
bots besides of detecting their behaviors. The total number of 
alerts could be varied in thestated experiments from the 
others’ experiments, since the default Snort rules set has been 
updated with the enhanced Snort rules, and with rules set from 
Bleeding Snort rules. The proposed model will count the total 
alerts, IRC message alerts and the percentages of the normal 
and malicious IRC messages.  
5.3.1 Case Study 1: Virtual Network 
Experiment Results 
As stated earlier, the first case study is including three 
different botnet scenarios, where each one comes with 
different botnet situations. The results and discussion of each 
scenario will be addressed as follows: 
1. Botnet Scenario 1: Detecting Multiple Kinds of Bots in 
Initial IRC Activity Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1 shows the obtained details from the result of first 
botnet scenario conducted in the experiment. As depicted in 
table 1, the proposed model could extract the following results 
after detecting the IRC bots:  The total IRC  messages are 
only occupying a percentage of 3% (324 alerts) of the total 
alerts (10,259),  and 56% (182 alerts) of them are malicious 
and the rest normal messages are 44% (142 alerts). Since 
there were 5 IRC bots with three legitimate IRC clients inside 
the monitored network. 
Table 1:Results of IRC Botnet Scenario 1 
T-A T-I 
P-I-
A 
N-I 
M-I P-
N-I 
P-
M-I 
I
-
B 
D-
I-
B 
10,2
59 
324 3% 142 
182 44% 56% 5 5 
 
Where: T-A: Total No. Alerts, T-I: Total No. of IRC 
messages, P-I-A: Percentage of IRC messages to the total No. 
of Alerts, N-I: No. of Normal IRC messages, M-I: No. of 
Malicious IRC messages,  P-N-I: Percentage of Normal IRC 
messages to total No. of IRC messages, P-M-I: Percentage of 
Malicious IRC messages to total No. of IRC messages, I-B: 
No. of IRC Bots inside the network and D-I-B: No. of 
Detected IRC Bots. 
By analyzing the IRC messages’ alerts and botnet attacks, the 
proposed model could prove the following objectives: 
1. The proposed model was accurate to detect all the infected 
IRC bots (the five bots). The accuracy of detection was 100%. 
As for  the accuracy of stating the current status for the 
detected bots, it was 80%.  Since there was only one bot out 
of the five bots, has not gotten its current status. 
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2. The proposed model could detect IRC botnet members 
that work in different IRC ports with different destination IP 
addresses for IRC C&C server. 
As for the filtered IRC malicious and normal alerts, the 
proposed model could filter them accurately after detecting 
the IRC bots as shown in table 1. 
2. Botnet Scenario 2: Detecting Multiple Kinds of Bots in 
Middle of IRC Activity Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows the details of the results obtained from 
conducting the second botnet scenario. As shown in the table, 
the total number of alerts is 2,073, and it is less than the total 
number of alerts in the previous botnet scenario.  This is 
because the time interval of the second scenario experiment 
was less than the first one,  there was no DDoS attack in this 
scenario and also, the number of IRC bots is less by one bot 
from the previous scenario. There were 8% (163 alerts) of the 
total alerts related to IRC messages, 41% (67 alerts) of them 
were malicious C&C responses messages. Since there are four 
bots in different situations inside the monitored network.  As 
for the normal IRC chatting, there were three normal IRC 
clients, and they had 59% (96 alerts) of the total IRC 
messages and all of them were directed to single IRC chatting 
server. 
Table 2:Results of IRC Botnet Scenario 2 
T-A T-I 
P-I-
A 
N-
I 
M
-I 
P-N-I P-
M-I 
I-
B 
D-
I-
B 
2,07
3 
163 8% 96 
67 59% 41% 4 4 
 
So, it has been shown from the above that the conducting of 
this scenario proved the following objectives: 
1. The proposed model was 100% accurate to detect the 
infected IRC bots in different situations (coherent mode or 
non-coherent mode). 
2. The added enhanced rules set could tag the destination port 
for the IRC C&C server of the botmaster. However, the 
tagging process may not work during the whole experiment 
interval or may not working at all, due to functional conflict 
between the rules and the Bleeding Snort rules for IRC 
message monitoring. 
3. The proposed model was 100% accurate to filter out the 
C&C responses messages from normal IRC messages even 
when the normal messages have single IRC server for 
destination IP and destination port just like the server of the 
IRC bot. 
3. Botnet Scenario 3: Detecting Single Bot Members at 
Different Situations Results and Discussion 
Table 3shows the details of the results obtained from 
conducting the experiment of botnet scenario 3. As depicted 
in the table, the total alerts obtained from the result were 
60,989 alerts and most of them were belonged to ICMP DDoS 
attack. As for IRC traffic, there were only 149 alerts for the 
IRC the messages. As stated earlier in the experiment of 
botnet scenario 3, there were three bots in different situations 
inside the monitored network, and they had 34% (50 alerts) of 
the total IRC messages as IRC responses messages. As for the 
normal IRC chatting messages, they took 66% (99 alerts) 
from the total IRC messages. 
Table 3 :Results of IRC Botnet Scenario 3 
T-A T-I 
P-I-
A 
N-
I 
M
-I 
P-N-I P-
M-I 
I-
B 
D-
I-
B 
60,9
89 
149 
0.2
% 
99 
40 66% 34% 3 3 
 
So, it has been shown from the above that the conducting of 
this scenario proved the desired objective of detecting 100%of 
the infected singles IRC bot(s). Even when they were in 
different situations with different activities (botnet attacks). 
5.3.2Case Study 2: Windows NT Attack 
DARPA 2000  Data set Results and 
Discussion 
Table 4 shows the results information of the conducted 
experiment of case study 2 for Windows NT Attack Inside 
tcpdump file.  The total number of alerts was 930 alerts for 
the whole interval time of monitoring, which was about 5.5 
hours. There were 35 IRC messages (4% of the total alerts) 
during the experiment, and all of them were normal IRC 
messages. As for botnet behavior detection, the Inside 
network data set testing archived one host performing two 
false positive botnet behaviors out of 40 hosts. These false 
positive results happened, since the detected activities are 
quite similar to the botnet attack's entropy. However, the false 
positive alerts could be filtered easily by adding the detected 
alerts  to the filtering alerts of botnet behaviors part in the 
proposed model to pass these alerts in the next time analysis. 
Table 4:Results of case study 2 for the Inside tcpdump file 
T-A T-I 
P-I-
A 
N-
I 
M
-I 
P-N-I P-
M-I 
I-
B 
D-
I-
B 
930 35 4% 35 0 100% 0% 0 0 
 
Table 5 shows the details of the results obtained from 
conducting the experiment of analyzing Windows NT Attack 
Outside tcpdump file. As depicted in the table, the total 
number of alerts was 481 and only 11% (53 IRC messages) of 
it was for IRC messages. However, this data set also does not 
contain any kind of botnet but it was tested to evaluate the 
proposed model ability to pass the normal IRC messages. The 
Outside network data set testing did not achieve any false 
positive results regarding to botnet behavior detection. 
Table 5:Results of case study 2 for the Outside tcpdump 
file 
T-A T-I 
P-I-
A 
N-
I 
M
-I 
P-N-I P-
M-I 
I-
B 
D-
I-
B 
481 53 11% 53 0 100% 0% 0 0 
 
The objective from the previous two experiments has been 
achieved and showed that the proposed model was accurate 
100% to  pass the legitimate IRC messages without any false 
positive results in IRC botnet detection. The conducting of the 
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experiment also shows some of the false positive results 
regarding to botnet behaviors (attack) detection.  
6. Comparison with other Botnet Detection 
Approaches 
It is hard to conduct a fair comparison between the existing 
approaches for botnet detection and the  proposed model. The 
reason is due to many factors, including; 
1. Every exiting approach has been evaluated into different 
network environment [26]. 
2. Different binary bots have been used in the experiments 
[26]. 
3. It is not easy to get and execute the binary code for each 
approach. 
So, the comparison will be in terms of the botnet 
characteristics for the chosen approaches. 
6.1 Comparison by Botnet Characteristics 
The comparison will  based on the botnet characteristics. 
These characteristics and the botnet approaches evaluations 
have been introduced byStinson and Mitchell in [17]. Table 6 
shows some of the selected botnet characteristics that will be 
used in the comparison. 
Table 6: Comparison of the proposed model with the other 
approaches based on botnet 
Characteristic Description 
Basis Type of the detection method whether 
host based or network-based. 
IRC Depending on specific IRC port number 
or specific model of communications 
patterns. 
Flow 
characteristics 
Depending on certain flow characteristics 
to correlate C&C communication or/and 
attacks. 
Time Using time window to correlate the 
network events. 
Network-based 
detection 
Depending on network-based detection 
attacksuch as DDoS attack. 
Syntax Depending detecting special command, 
nicknameor protocol syntax. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of the proposed model with the other 
approaches based on botnetCharacteristics 
Appr
oach 
Basis IRC 
Flow-
chars. 
Time Net-
base
d 
Syntax 
Bothu
nter 
Net- Yes 
No Yes Yes 
Yes 
Botsn
iffer 
Net- Yes 
No Yes Yes 
Yes 
Rishi Net- Yes No No No Yes 
The 
propo
sed  
model 
Net- Yes 
Pps No Yes 
Yes 
 
Table 7 shows the comparison of the proposed model with the 
comparative approaches. This comparison stated that the 
proposed model is not depending on a specific time window; 
instead of that IRC C&C responses will be correlated into two 
ways. The first kind of correlation will be for the C&C 
responses on non-standard IRC ports, where general 
clustering approach will be used for clustering the C&C 
responses messages. The second kind will be for the standard 
IRC ports, where the packet per second (pps) characteristic 
will be used for filtering the C&C responses of the IRC bot. 
Pps also has been used in the correlation of the outgoing C&C 
response that is related to an outgoing botnet attack. This 
correlation method has been used to detect the single bot on 
the standard IRC ports and to correlate the C&C responses 
behavior with the botnet attacks. The comparison shows also 
that Rishi has the minimum dependency over the all 
approaches, but the fact is Rishi can be evaded easier than the 
other approaches since it is depending on certain predefined 
templates of suspicious nicknames [14][17]. Bots nicknames 
could be varied from bot to bot, so Rishi may not have their 
nickname's pattern on its templates, rather than the false 
positive results that could be produced from using such 
approach [14]. 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper,  a multi-phase model for detecting the IRC 
botnet and botnet behavior has been proposed. The detection 
method depends on the outgoing IRC C&C responses 
messages between the bots and their botmaster. After 
conducting several different experiments to evaluate the 
proposed model efficiency, the conclusion is that the proposed 
model could detect even new and single IRC bots like 
(CRIME SCENE IRC bot) which has a random responding 
time. The malicious IRC C&C responses messages can be 
filtered out from the normal ones as a result of detecting their 
sources (the IRC bots).  Botnet behaviors like DDoS attacks 
could be verified also by the proposed model. So these 
behaviors could indicate that the attacking host(s) is a botnet 
member(s) regardless of the used protocol for C&C 
instructions. The proposed model still not the complete and 
perfect solution for IRC botnet and botnet behavior detection 
problem. There are some situations make the model fail to 
detect the bots totally or partly. The bots that used encrypted 
IRC channel will not be detected, but the proposed model still 
able to detect the IRC botnet attacks as long as Snort can 
detect them. The proposed model could be evaded if the 
attacker knows the internal structure of the proposed model.  
The attacker can run the bots on the defined range of the 
standard IRC ports and make the bots responding time in a 
random way to break the pps correlation method. In this 
situation, the whitelist strategy can help to filter the IRC 
traffic of a certain application when the network administrator 
chooses to modify the default standard IRC ports on the 
proposed model. Finally, the proposed model is not 
designated to prevent IRC botnet attacks from happening, as 
is the case in IDS. But still interesting for the network 
administrator to see the IRC traffic analysis for botnet 
detection, to take an action based on the results’ analysis 
immediately. 
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